CE Plus · Test case 1

Cyber Essentials Plus Test 1: the external vulnerability scan

What the Cyber Essentials Plus remote vulnerability assessment covers: every public IP including IaaS, the recommended ports, how each internet-facing service is judged, and how to pass it.

By Precursor Security, an IASME Certification BodyUpdated 22 September 2026
Short answer

Test case 1 of Cyber Essentials Plus is an external vulnerability scan of every IP address the organisation uses, including IaaS, on the Delivery Partner's recommended TCP and UDP ports. Each internet-accessible service discovered is judged pass or fail. The test case passes only if every service passes. It is not sampled.

Key facts
Test purpose
Applies to
Tool
Ports
Pass rule
Control tested

What does Test 1 check?

Test 1 is a remote vulnerability scan of every public IP address your organisation uses, including IaaS, looking for internet-facing services with known weaknesses.

The first test case looks at your organisation from the outside. It simulates the opportunist attacker who scans the internet for services with known weaknesses, rather than a targeted adversary.

Cyber Essentials Plus Test Specification v3.2

Test purpose: To test whether an Internet-based opportunist attacker can hack into the Applicant's system with typical low-skill methods.

  • Identify all of the IP addresses currently in use by the applicant. This must include IaaS where used.
  • Scan all identified IP addresses on the recommended set of TCP and UDP ports.
  • For each internet-accessible service discovered, use the flow diagram and notes to determine whether to record a pass or fail result for the service.

Which addresses are scanned?

Every address, not a sample. That includes office broadband and leased-line addresses, any public addresses at branch sites, the public side of VPN concentrators, and every IaaS instance with a public address (for example Azure virtual machines, AWS EC2 instances and cloud-hosted firewalls).

Where an internet connection uses a dynamic address, the specification allows the scope to be defined by DNS entries instead. The assessor is warned to take care that carrier-grade NAT does not send assessment traffic to the wrong destination, which is a practical reason to give the assessor accurate, current addresses.

Home workers on ISP routers are not scanned: those routers are out of scope under v3.3 and the firewall control is met by a software firewall on the device.

How is each service judged?

The specification gives the assessor a seven-step flow diagram (Figure 1, 'Sub-test flow diagram for assessing services accessible through the firewall') and the assessor records a pass or fail for each service. Test 1 passes only if every service passes.

The steps run in order. 1: does the service include vulnerabilities that score 7.0 or more (high risk)? Yes is a fail. 2: does it give access only to information that is both public and read only? Yes is a pass. 3: do users need to authenticate to access it? No is a fail. 4: is authentication based on two or more factors? Yes is a pass. 5: have default passwords for the service been changed? No is a fail. 6: does it throttle login attempts to defend against brute-force password guessing? Yes is a pass. 7: does it lock users out after at most 10 failed login attempts? Yes is a pass, No is a fail.

Step 1 comes first and has no exceptions in the diagram: a scored vulnerability of 7.0 or more on an exposed service fails it, whatever else is in place. The diagram tests the service, not your paperwork, so a service can pass Test 1 and still breach a requirement in the question set, for example a firewall admin page opened to the internet without the documented need A4.10 asks for.

Exposed serviceDiagram step that decides itResult
Any service with a vulnerability scored 7.0 or moreStep 1Fail
Public, read-only website with no high-risk findingsStep 2Pass
Service that gives non-public access without any sign-inStep 3Fail
VPN or admin portal that requires MFAStep 4Pass
Login page still using the vendor's default passwordStep 5Fail
Password-only login with throttling or lockout at 10 attempts or fewerSteps 6 and 7Pass
Password-only login with no throttling and no lockoutStep 7Fail

How do you pass Test 1?

Most of the work is done in your own firewall rule review and patch cycle before the assessor arrives.

  • List every public address and IaaS instance from A2.5 and check the list against your ISP contracts and cloud consoles.
  • Run your own external scan on the same address list and fix every finding that scores 7.0 or more, whatever its age: step 1 of the flow diagram fails a service with any such vulnerability.
  • Close every inbound rule without a documented business need, and record the need for the ones that stay (A4.8).
  • Move firewall, router and hypervisor management off the internet, or put MFA or an IP allow list in front of it (A4.9 to A4.11).
  • Update VPN, firewall and router firmware. Appliances are a common source of unpatched high-severity findings.
  • Re-scan after fixes and keep the report. The assessor may ask how you manage the firewall (A4.5) and when the rules were last reviewed (A4.6).

How do assessors check this?

How assessors check this
Common failure: The forgotten management interface

Related pages

Frequently asked questions

No. It is an automated vulnerability scan on a defined port list using a tool approved by the Delivery Partner, aimed at the low-skill opportunist attacker. It does not attempt exploitation or manual testing.

Yes. The specification states the address list must include IaaS where used. SaaS platforms such as Microsoft 365 are not scanned because you do not own their addresses; they are tested through Test 4.

The scope may be defined by DNS entries instead of addresses. Give the assessor the DNS names that resolve to your connection and confirm they are current on the day.

The Delivery Partner specifies the TCP and UDP port list. The NCSC suggests nmap's well-known port list as a starting point. Assume that any commonly used service port will be checked.

A finding that scores below 7.0 does not fail the service at step 1 of the flow diagram. The service still has to get through the remaining steps (public read-only content, or authentication with MFA, changed default passwords and throttling or lockout). The assessor may add an advisory note recommending you fix the finding.

No. Under v3.3, routers not supplied by the organisation are out of scope, so the firewall control is met by a software firewall on the device and the home address is not in the scan list.

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